It is now just over three years since it became apparent that blood and blood product therapy carried with them the risk of infecting recipients with the then unknown causative agent of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS).
It was not long before the general public became aware of the risk of this possible means of transmission of the disease. Apprehension grew with the realization that effective action to ensure the safety of the blood supply from this threat was seriously limited by the fact that the causative agent was as yet unknown.
By early 1983, these circumstances made it necessary in countries where the incidence of AIDS was recognized as epidemic to adopt empirical, epidemiologically-based donor screening measures in order to minimize the risk of receiving unsafe blood. The new and different approaches implemented as a result of this initiative included education of donors as to the various high-risk factors associated with development and/or transmission of AIDS. Those with these high-risk factors were informed of their obligation to exclude themselves from donating blood. These measures became operative in both the United States and Canada by March 1983.
Given the psychological and sociological implications of such measures, it is to the credit of both the donors concerned and the blood collection and From The Canadian Red Cross Society Blood Transfusion Service, 95 Wellesley Street East, Toronto, Ontario, M4Y IH6.
processing agencies that to date the supply of blood and blood products has, despite periods of serious depletion, remained adequate to meet therapeutic demands.
These measures have been acknowledged retrospectively to be sufficiently effective that they are listed as a primary precaution in the international guidelines for AIDS screening adopted in October 1985 by the International Society of Blood Transfusionists (ISBT).' The indirectness of the measures, however, did little to allay the fears of either those requiring regular and continuing treatment with blood and blood products, such as haemophiliacs, or the general public, for whom haemotherapy was only a hypothetical consideration.
The encouraging discoveries of French and U.S. scientists later in 1983 and early in 1984 culminated in the recognition of a retrovirus as the causative agent of AIDS. The identification of what is now referred to as the human T-lymphotrophic virus III or lymphadenopathy-associated virus (HTLV-11F LAV) made it possible to take a more direct approach to ensuring the safety of at least some blood products when it was learned, in May 1984, that the organism was particularly sensitive to heat inactivation at relatively low temperatures. 2 Within months of the announcement of this possible means of improving the safety of some forms of haemotherapy, plasma fractionators had developed procedures that effectively inactivate the virus without adversely affecting the properties, potency and yield of plasma proteins, such as coagulaticha factors and albumin. By December 1984, it was possible to assure Canadian haemophilia patients that, within six months -the estimat-ed time required for processing of Canadian plasma and its delivery to the Canadian Red Cross -all coagulation products provided by the Society would be heat-treated and the threat that their use might be a source of AIDS infection obviated.
Nevertheless, in the absence of a test that could be applied to donations on a routine basis to ensure that no blood or blood product capable of transmitring AIDS would be transfused, general confidence in the safety of the blood supply remained uncertain.
This deficiency was overcome considerably sooner than expected, since scientists at the U.S. National Institutes of Health were able to apply their special cell culture skills to the rapid production of HTLV-II1/LAV in quantities suitable for the large scale manufacture of an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA test). This test screens for the presence of antibodies to the virus and was found to have measurability and time characteristics that made it suitable for adaptation to the requirements of a routine blood screening programme.
By early 1985, test kits produced by five different manufacturers were ready for pre-licensing evaluation by several of the major North American blood collection agencies, including the Canadian Red Cross. By March of that year, the first licensed test was implemented by the American Red Cross (ARC) as part of its routine blood screening programme.
The criterion for discarding blood as unsafe for transfusion is that it be repeatably reactive* by the ELISA HTLV-III/LAV antibody procedure. This is considered to eliminate at least 95 per cent of potentially infectious bloods. The effect of this programme to further ensure the safety of the blood supply from transmission of the AIDS virus can best be judged by the figures currently available from the American Red Cross. With three million blood donations tested, the ARC has found it necessary to discard slightly under 0.4 per cent of blood donations; that is, 12,000 units (unpublished data).
Confirmatory testing of the repeatably reactive bloods by a more specific but much more timeconsuming antibody screening procedure, termed "the Western Blot," indicated that approximately *Minimum of two positive ELISA tests.
1,200 of the 12,000 units were definitively positive for the antibody. This would indicate that approximately one in every 2,500 American Red Cross blood donors was found to be confirmed positive for the antibody (unpublished data).
Given that the sensitivity of the ELISA test is approximately 95 per cent, it can be calculated that the chances now of a unit of blood positive for the antibody to the AIDS virus being transfused in the United States are roughly one in 250,000.
Much has been made of the fact that it was not until some six months after the American Red Cross initiated its anti-HTLV-1II/LAV blood screening programme that a similar programme became operational in the Canadian Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service. While it is not the purpose of this editorial to attempt to justify any delay in the implementation of the screening in Canada, it is worthy of note that the commencement of testing by the American Red Cross was by no means indicative that such testing was undertaken simultaneously nationwide in the U.S. In fact, it was close to six months before comprehensive implementation could be achieved.
Complicated funding considerations, such as the profound differences in the way the Canadian and U.S. health care systems are financed, account in part for the difference in the implementation dates in the two countries. In the U.S., the rather substantial additional costs of testing could simply be added to the cost of a unit of blood to the user; whereas in Canada, provincial health ministries had to re-apportion funds budgeted for other purposes to cover those costs.
In addition, it was necessary to obtain a commitment from the provinces that they would make available, simultaneously with the implementation of the Red Cross testing programme, alternative testing facilities. This was considered to be essential in order to avoid the possible use of blood donation as a means of determining AIDS antibody status, thereby increasing the risk of contamination of the blood supply.
The Canadian Red Cross blood donation screening programme for the antibody to HTLV-III/LAV was actually initiated in October 1985, slightly over two months after full funding and commitment to the establishment of alternate testing facilities were announced. By the first week of November 1985 all fresh blood components being distributed nationally had been screened for presence of the antibody.
Canadian Red Cross figures for the first two months of the screening programme indicate that the number of repeatably ELISA reactive units of blood discarded and the incidence of confirmed HTLV-1II/LAV antibody positive donors are slightly lower, but essentially similar to those reported by the American Red Cross; that is, 0.25 per cent and 0.025 per cent respectively.
Given the current state of knowledge concerning just what the presence of antibody signifies about infectivity, it is difficult to project fully the extent of the risk in Canada of developing AIDS as an outcome of receiving blood or blood product therapy. Additional related imponderables at this time include the viral dosage factor, host susceptibility and presence of virus without detectable antibodies.
What can be said with a good deal of confidence, however, is that currently in Canada essentially all that can be done to ensure the safety of blood and blood products with respect to the transmission of AIDS is being done. There have been 14 reported cases attributed to receipt of blood or blood products since 1981,3 all relevant haemotherapy having been given prior to the introduction of laboratory testing. Presumably, these would have been reduced by 95 per cent had the test been available throughout that period. Since there has been no dramatic increase in the number of cases of AIDS reported among Canadian recipients, it would be reasonable to conclude that the risk of developing AIDS from these sources has now been reduced to minuscule proportions.
What the influence of the introduction of anti-HTLV-III/LAV blood donation screening will be on the adequacy of the Canadian blood supply remains to be seen. The test has great merit when used for the purpose for which it was developed, viz. blood donation screening. Unfortunately, in Canada, as indeed in almost all countries where the test is being carried out, there is a strong possibility of misinterpretation of a positive test result as indicative not only of AIDS, but also of promiscuity, homosexual activity and various other more or less socially unacceptable types of behaviour.
Thus, the assurance of confidentiality of test results is a matter of extreme importance when informing blood donors that their donation -and by inference, they -will be tested. The requirement in some provinces that the Red Cross report to public health authorities the identity of individuals whose blood tests positive for the antibody may well further discourage donors who are chafing already under the incursions that AIDS has made on their altruistic act of giving blood. It is to be hoped that this will not lead to loss of donors with resultant inadequate blood supplies for therapeutic requirements. It could be avoided by a more flexible attitude on the part of public health authorities until the necessity for such reporting can be based on firmer evidence of the need for follow-up of antibody positive individuals beyond that which can currently be accomplished by education and through counselling by family physicians.
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Le SIDA et la sfiret6 des approvisionnements en sang au Canada
I1 y a maintenant un peu plus de trois ans qu'on s'est rendu compte que l'utilisation du sang et des produits sanguins ~ des fins th6rapeutiques comportait, pour le receveur, un risque d'infection par l'agent responsable (mais ~ l'6poque non identifi6) du syndrome d'immunod6ficience acquise (SIDA).
Rapidement, le grand public est devenu conscient des risques de transmission de la maladie par le moyen de la transfusion, et son inqui6tude s'est accrue au fur et ~t mesure qu'il a constat6 que la s6cudt6 des approvisionnements en sang 6tait compromise du fait que l'agent causal de l'affection 6tait inconnu.
Au d6but de 1983, cet 6tat de choses a forc6 les pays o~ le SIDA prenait des proportions 6piddmi-ques ~ adopter des mesures empiriques pour le d6pistage 6pid6miologique des donneurs potentiellement dangereux. Parmi les mesures adopt6es, mentionnons l'information aux donneurs sur les facteurs les plus propres tt favoriser le d6veloppe-ment ou la transmission du SIDA et l'invitation lanc~e aux personnes les plus susceptibles d'etre porteuses de l'agent causal h s'abstenir de donner du sang. Ces mesures 6taient en vigueur aux t~tats-Unis et au Canada d~s mars 1983. l~tant donn6 la port6e psychologique et sociologique de ces mesures, on ne peut que louer les donneurs et les organismes de collecte d'avoir maintenu, en d6pit de p6riodes de p6nurie s6rieuse, les approvisionnements hun niveau suffisant pour r6pondre aux besoins des utilisateurs.
En r6trospective, on peut dire que ces mesures ont ~t6 si efficaces qu'elles sont devenues partie int6grante des r~gles pr6conis6es en octobre 1985 par la Soci6t6 internationale de transfusion sanguine en ce qui a trait au d6pistage du SIDA. l Mais, 6tant indirectes, ces mesures n'ont pas suffi "a calmer I'inqui6tude des utilisateurs habituels du sang et des produits sanguins, comme les h6mophiles, ou du grand public, pour qui la th~rapeutique transfusionhelle n'a qu'une signification hypoth6tique.
Fin 83 et d6but 84, les travaux de chercheurs fran~ais et 6tats-uniens aboutissaient ~ la mise en 6vidence d'un rdtrovirus comme agent du SIDA. L'identification du microorganisme qu'on appelle aujourd'hui HTLV-III/LAV ("human T-lymphotropic virus" ou "lymphadenopathy-associated virus") et la d6couverte, en mai 1984, que ce virus pouvait &re inactiv6 ~ des temp6ratures relativement peu 61ev~es 2 ont permis d'accroitre la s6cudt6 d'au moins quelques-uns des produits sanguins.
Quelques mois plus tard, les usines de fractionnement avaient mis au point des techniques efficaces d'inactivation du virus qui n'affectent en rien la quantit6 des prot6ines plasmatiques obtenues (en particulier l'albumine et les facteurs de la coagulation), ni leur propri6t6s. En d6cembre 84, on pouvait assurer les h6mophiles du Canada que, darts un d61ai de six mois (le temps n6eessaire pour que le plasma pr61ev6 au Canada soit livr6 h la CroixRouge canadienne pour distribution), les produits de fractionnement du plasma fournis par la Soci6t6 seraient tous trait6s par la chaleur et rendus inoffensifs pour ce qui est de I'HTLV-III/LAV.
Toutefois, en l'absence d'un contr61e syst6mati-que des dons de sang pour 6viter la transmission du virus par voie transfusionnelle, le grand public restait sceptique.
Cette carence a 6t6 combl6e beaucoup plus tbt que pr6vu du fait que certains scientifiques des National Institutes of Health des l~.tats-Unis, mettant contribution leur exp6rience de la culture des cellules, ont r6ussi ~ produire de I'HTLV-III/LAV en quantit6s suffisantes pour la commercialisation d'un ELISA ("enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay") de d6tection des anticorps anti-HTLV-Ill/ LAV. On s'est vite rendu compte que cette 6preuve pouvait donner des r6sultats mesurables, et ce dans un d61ai suffisant pour qu'on I'adopte aux fins du d6pistage syst6matique dans les dons de sang.
Au d6but de 1985, les organismes nordam6ricains de collecte de sang, dont la Croix-Rouge canadienne, ont fait l'6tude des trousses mises sur le march~ par cinq fabricans diff6rents dans le but de savoir si ces trousses pouvaient recevoir l'aval des autorit6s santitaires. Dd:s le mois de mars 85, la Croix-Rouge am6dcaine adoptait le premier test officiellement accept6 et I'introduisait dans sa batterie d'6preuves pratiqu6es syst6matiquement sur tousles dons de sang.
C'est une r6action positive r6p6t6e* lors de I'ELISA des anti-HTLV-III/LAV qui constitue le crit~re du rejet d'un don de sang. On estime qu'avec ce test, on peut 61iminer au moins 95 pour cent des sangs potentiellement infectants. On peut se rendre compte de l'effet de cette mesure sur la s6curit6 du sang ou des produits sanguins en consultant les demi~res statistiques de la Croix-Rouge am6d-caine, qui a trouv6, sur trois millions de dons de sang, 12000 sacs r6agissant positivement lors du test, soit 0,4 pour cent (donn6es non encore publi6es).
De ce hombre, environ 1200 sacs ont r6agi positivement/t une 6preuve de contr61e ("Western Blot") plus sp6cifique mais aussi beaucoup plus *Minimum de deux ELISA positifs. longue d'exrcution. Ce qui veut dire que, dans le cas de la Croix-Rouge amrricaine, environ l donneur sur 2500 a rragi positivement aux deux types de tests de drpistage des anticorps anti-HTLV-III/LAV (donnres non encore publires).
Comme on estime ~t 95 pour cent la sensibilit6 de I'ELISA, on peut dire qu'aux l~tats-Unis, le risque de transfusion d'un sac de sang rragissant positivement ou des produits provenant de ce sac est, grosso modo, de 1/250000.
On a beaucoup fait 6tat du prrtendu drlai dont se serait rendu responsable le Service de transfusion de la Croix-Rouge canadienne dans la mise en application du drpistage systrmatique des anticorps anti-HTLV-IWLAV, 6tant donn6 que la Croix-Rouge am6ricaine a commenc6 ~ ex6cuter le test six mois avant nous. Bien que cet 6ditorial n'ait pas pour but de justifier ce drlai, il importe de souligner qu'~t la date o~ la Croix-Rouge am6ricaine a commenc~ utiliser le test, celui-ci 6tait loin d'rtre utilis6 sur l'ensemble du territoire amrricain et que son emploi n'est devenu grnrralis6 qu'au bout de six mois.
Des facteurs financiers complexes, fondrs sur les diffrrences de structure des spins m~dicaux de part et d'autre de la fronti~re, expliquent en grande pattie le temps qui s'est 6coul6 entre la mise en application du test aux I~.tats-Unis et au Canada. Aux Etats-Unis, on ajoute tout simplement le coot relativement 61ev6 du test au prix que doit payer le receveur, alors qu'au Canada, les autoritrs comp6tentes ont dO, pour financer l'opfration, redistribuer des crrdits drjh affectrs b. des postes budgrtaires donnrs.
En outre, avant la mise en place du programme de drpistage, les autorit6s sanitaires des provinces ont dO s'engager ~ rendre accessible le test aux mrdecins en dehors de la Croix-Rouge, car, autrement, le don du sang aurait pu devenir pour ceux-ci un moyen de connaitre la prrsence des anticorps anti-HTLV-III/LAV chez certains sujets, ce qui aurait augment6 le degr6 de contamination de nos approvisionnements en sang.
C'est en octobre 85 que la Croix-Rouge canadienne a mis en vigueur le drpistage systrmatique des anticorps anti-HTLV-III/LAV, spit un peu plus de deux mois apr~s que les provinces eurent accept6 de le financer et aussi d'offrir aux mrdecins la possibilit6 de faire le test dans certains laboratoires quand il s'agissait de malades. D~s la premiere Reste ~ savoir de quelle mani~re le drpistage des anti-HTLV-III/LAV influencera le don du sang. La raison d'etre du test est avant tout le drpistage des donneurs potentiellement infectants. Malheureusement, ici comme dans la plupart des pays oO on le pratique, il y a de grosses chances que la population interpr~te les rrsultats comme s'ils constituaient une preuve d'infection av~Srre, de promiscuitr, d'activitrs homosexuelles ou d'autres comportements plus ou moins condanmrs par la socirtr.
C'est pourquoi il est extrrmement important de respecter le caract~re confidentiel des rrsultats au moment d'informer le donneur que son sang (ou lui-m~me par vole de cons6quence) doit 6tre soumis ~t des 6preuves de confirmation. Le fait que certaines provinces exigent de la Croix-Rouge qu'elle r6v~le aux autorit6s sanitaires I'identit6 des sujets ayant r6agi positivement au test de d6pistage pourrait bien dEcourager davantage les donneurs qui h6sitent d6ja ~. donner leur sang b. cause de l'ombre que le SIDA a jet6 sur leur altruisme.
I1 faut esp6rer de toute fa~on que cet 6tat de choses ne r6duira pas le nombre de nos donneurs et, partant, l'importance de nos approvisionnements. Une telle 6ventualit~ pourrait &re ~vit6e si les autorit6s sanitaires se montraient plus flexibles, en tout cas tant que la n6cessit8 d'une telle d6claration ne sera pas fond6 sur des arguments formels indiquant qu'il est n6cessaire de faire plus, dans le cas des sujets porteurs d'anticorps, que de leur enseigner les r6gles d'hygi~ne qui les concernent. Or ceci ale plus de chances d'6tre fait correctement par le m6decin de famille.
